THE RIGHT TO RECEIVE INFORMATION:
THE CURRENT STATE OF THE DOCTRINE AND THE BEST
APPLICATION FOR THE FUTURE
Jamie Kennedy∗
Generally, the United States Supreme Court interprets the First
1
Amendment of the United States Constitution to imply a negative
2
right that prevents the government from placing obstacles in the
3
path of constitutionally protected speech.
This interpretation
focuses on the rights of the speaker, preventing the government from
4
restraining protected speech. To enforce speech restrictions in
5
public forums, the government must withstand strict scrutiny.
Another context has emerged, however, where the focus of the
First Amendment’s protections shifts to an audience’s right to receive
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1
U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”).
2
Frank B. Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857, 864 (2001).
The distinction between positive and negative rights is an intuitive one.
One category is a right to be free from government, while the other is a
right to command government action. A ‘positive right is a claim to
something . . . while a negative right is a right that something not be
done . . . .’
Id.
3
See generally KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1360-1461 (14th ed. 2001) (setting forth a discussion of the rights ancillary to
freedom of speech). This Comment will rely on the definition of a right as a
constitutionally protected restraint on government. See id. When professing a right,
the Supreme Court generally relies on negative rights as a way to facilitate a citizen’s
constitutionally mandated freedoms by preventing certain government action rather
than requiring it. Cross, supra note 2, at 860.
4
Cross, supra note 2, at 902.
5
See generally SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 3. To overcome a test of strict
scrutiny, the government must show “its action is necessary to achieve a compelling
interest.” ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 237
(2d ed. 2001).
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information, as opposed to an individual’s rights to speak. Since the
7
1940s, the Court has referred to a right to receive information in
8
various contexts. In some cases, the right to receive information
requires the government to provide the press and the public access to
9
information uniquely in its possession. This implies an affirmative
governmental act to facilitate speech rather than merely lifting
barriers to promote free speech. But American society generally
10
dislikes rights that require positive government action.
For this
reason, the parameters of the right to receive information have never
been fully articulated, and the Court has never given the right full
11
support.
As later illustrated, the right is best used when lifting
barriers to promote free speech.
In 2003, Justice Breyer addressed the right to receive
information in his concurring opinion in United States v. American
12
Library Association, however, that opinion left unresolved the
strength of the right, and the proper context in which it should be
13
applied. This Comment will address what the Court’s decision in
American Library Association signifies for the right to receive
information and will further provide the best use of the right to
receive information for the future. Part I examines the contexts in
which the right has been invoked, the instability of the right and the
varying degrees of support it has received over the years. Part II
discusses the notion of positive and negative rights as applied to the
right to receive information. Part III examines American Library
Association in detail and discusses where the right stands today.
6

See William E. Lee, The Supreme Court and the Right to Receive Expression, 1987
SUP. CT. REV. 303, 306 (1988).
7
Id. at 305.
8
Id. at 306. See infra Part I.
9
See, e.g., Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986); Press-Enter. Co.
v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457
U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980);
Gannet v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1978); Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
10
See Cross, supra note 2, at 880. Professor Cross argues that reliance on positive
rights is not the optimum choice for protecting constitutionally mandated freedoms
because of the way the U.S. Government works, particularly due to the difficulties the
judiciary faces in enforcing such rights. Id. at 862. The most blatant concern is not
to undermine the power and legitimacy of the Court. Id.
11
Lee, supra note 6, at 307.
12
539 U.S. 194 (2003).
13
The plurality opinion, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, ignored the right to
receive information in the analysis. Only Justice Breyer’s concurrence acknowledged
the right, and his use of the right does not follow the Court’s previous analysis in
cases of a similar kind. Id. at 216. See Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
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Finally, part IV suggests the strongest context for application of the
right and how the Court should utilize it in future cases.
I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND INSTABILITY IN APPLICATION

The Court has invoked the right to receive information in a
variety of scenarios which can be organized into three categories: (1)
the use of the right to prevent the government from placing barriers
between speakers and listeners of constitutionally protected speech;
(2) the use of the right to require government intervention to
compel affirmative actions by the press; and (3) the use of the right
to claim access to information that is in the government’s possession
due to funding constraints to facilitate the free exchange of
14
information and an informed public. The second category often
requires the government to perform an affirmative act to facilitate
15
the flow of expression. In all contexts, the right is justified as a tool
16
to promote the marketplace of ideas and a well-informed public.
Scholars have justified the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment in terms of the search for truth and the ability to self17
govern and participate in a democratic government. Overarching
all of the theories, however, is the marketplace of ideas, first
18
articulated by Justice Holmes in his dissent in Abrams v. United States.
Since then, “[s]cholars and jurists frequently have used the image of
a ‘marketplace of ideas’ to explain and justify the [F]irst
19
[A]mendment freedoms of speech and press.”
The theory
“ultimately assures the proper evolution of society, wherever that
20
evolution might lead.” As the theory developed, jurists began to
view the marketplace as an essential tool for participation in
21
government or self-government by allowing “a free and full
14

Lee, supra note 6, at 306.
Id.
16
See Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J.
1, 2-6 (1984).
17
See id.
18
250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). “[T]he best test of truth is the power of thought to
get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . .” Id.
19
Ingber, supra note 16, at 2.
20
Id. at 3. The marketplace of ideas is a metaphor to describe the way in which
the Court has found two corollary rights. Pico, 457 U.S. at 867. The sellers, or the
speaker of the information, have the freedom to speak. Ingber, supra note 16, at 4.
In order to make their freedom effective, the buyers, or the receivers of information,
must also have a freedom to receive it. Id.
21
Ingber, supra note 16, at 4. To protect a democracy and self-government,
15
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competition of ideas within the community, rather than by
paternalistic state-sponsored efforts to protect citizens from the ill
22
effects of bad ideas.” Going hand in hand with the marketplace of
ideas are the theories of a well-informed public, individual autonomy,
23
and uninhibited debate.
Justice Brennan explored the right to receive information in his
24
concurrence in Lamont v. Postmaster General. The Justice stated, “I
think the right to receive publications is such a fundamental right.
The dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise
25
willing addressees are not free to receive and consider them.”
Justice Brennan further pointed out that the government’s job is not
to monitor and decide for citizens what information they should
26
receive.
Instead, the government should merely facilitate the
process and only assist a citizen in ridding himself or herself of
unwanted communication when that citizen specifically requests such
27
assistance. This theory tends to persuade the Court in that it does
not differentiate amongst the type of speech the First Amendment
protects; therefore the Court has accepted the premise in numerous
cases. It is a broad interpretation of freedom to speak and listen and
“generally requires government to avoid making subjective value
judgments about either the specific content of speech or the means
28
of communication.” Ultimately, those jurists would subscribe to a
broad interpretation of free speech and “believe that if only
citizens need the ability to access as much information as possible to make informed
choices. Id. at 8. This is necessary to facilitate assessment of political candidates and
political issues, influence government, hold governmental officials accountable and
enable dissent when necessary. Id.
22
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Chrysanthemum, the Sword and the First
Amendment: Disentangling Culture, Community and Freedom of Expression, 1998 WIS. L.
REV. 905, 914 (1998).
23
Id.
24
381 U.S. 301 (1965).
25
Id. at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall are
historically the strongest proponents of a strong right to receive information. See,
e.g., Pico, 457 U.S. 853; Lamont, 381 U.S. 301.
26
Lamont, 381 U.S. at 308.
27
Id. Ideally, the government should only act when a citizen requests assistance;
however, the statute in Lamont required the government to act paternalistically and
decide for citizens what information they should or should not receive. Id. Not only
does this fail to give citizens enough freedom in their personal affairs, but it also puts
the government in a position to act rather than step back and allow the flow of
information. Id. at 310. Striking down the statute in Lamont ensured citizens’ ability
to continue to be self-governing. Id.
28
Krotoszynski, supra note 22, at 915.
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government can be kept away from ‘ideas,’ the self-operating force of
‘[f]ull and free discussion’ will promote ideas that are ‘true to our
29
genius’ and keep us from ‘embracing what is cheap and false.’”
A. Government Barriers
1.

Restrictions on speech struck down due to audience
interest

A number of cases invoke the right to receive information to
30
prevent governmental obstacles to the dissemination of information.
31
One of the earliest cases, Martin v. City of Struthers, involved a
Jehovah’s Witness who walked door-to-door ringing doorbells to
32
publicize a religious meeting, and in doing so, violated a city
ordinance barring the distribution of “handbills, circulars or other
33
advertisements” through door-to-door solicitation. In announcing
the opinion of the Court, Justice Black stressed the broad scope of
the freedom of speech and press and found that it “embraces the
right to distribute literature and necessarily protects the right to
34
receive it.” In coming to this conclusion, the Court balanced the
rights of the speaker and the rights of the individual householder
35
against the interests of the entire community.
In the end, the
interests of the speaker and the potential audience prevailed, as the
individual householders must be given the opportunity to choose
whether to listen to the speaker’s message, rather than having the
36
community choose for them.
The ordinance in Martin stood as a barrier to protected

29

Ingber, supra note 16, at 10 (alteration in original) (quoting Dennsi v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 584 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
30
See e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (barring a company-owned
town from imposing criminal punishment on a person who was distributing religious
literature); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (prohibiting a state from
taxing Jehovah’s Witnesses for spreading or selling religious literature as an
unconstitutional violation of the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ First Amendment rights).
31
319 U.S. 141 (1943).
32
Id. at 142.
33
Id. The purpose of the ordinance was to prevent unsolicited visitors from
distributing information, including, but not limited to, commercial information. Id.
The City of Struthers cited peace, order and comfort of the community as reasons for
the ordinance. Id. at 144.
34
Id. at 143.
35
Martin, 319 U.S. at 143.
36
Id. at 144.
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37

communications. Justice Black pointed out that this barrier can act
to prevent “dissemination of ideas in accordance with the best
38
traditions of free discussion.”
The Court emphasized that
“[f]reedom to distribute information to every citizen wherever he
desires to receive it is so clearly vital to the preservation of a free
society that, putting aside reasonable police and health regulations of
39
time and manner of distribution, it must be fully preserved.”
Importantly, Martin marks the first time the Court has considered the
right to receive information. While the Court did not expressly rely
upon this right in its holding, Martin represents the first step towards
the Court’s recognition of the right. The Court determined the
proper use of the right to receive information was to allow a free
exchange of ideas without government intervention to mold the
nature of those ideas or to protect citizens from undesirable
40
information.
41
Two years later, the Court noted the right in Thomas v. Collins.
In Thomas, a Texas district court enjoined a union president and
labor organizer from soliciting members for labor union
membership. His actions violated a Texas statute because he did not
42
properly obtain an organizer’s card.
Because Thomas had not
registered with the State, the district court prevented him from
43
making a public speech regarding the merits of joining a union.
The Court’s holding in Thomas, although narrow as it only
related to Thomas’s particular circumstances, clarifies the Court’s

37

Id. The two parties whose rights were at issue were the speaker and the person
whose doorbell the speaker rang. Id. The Court found it is necessary to protect both
sides when protecting speech in this category. Id.
38
Id. at 145.
39
Martin, 319 U.S. at 146-47. This statement would lead to the conclusion that
the Court’s interest in protecting the right would require strict scrutiny, thus giving
the right a strong status. Id. From Justice Black’s language, the inference can be
drawn that only a compelling governmental interest, i.e., public health and safety,
would prevent a citizen from soliciting door to door. Id. at 147. In this case, there
were other ways to satisfy health and safety concerns, such as trespass ordinances,
while still allowing citizens to make their own choice about the information being
offered. Id. at 147-48.
40
Id. at 148.
41
323 U.S. 516 (1945).
42
Id. at 519; TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 5 (1943). The Legislature designed section 5
to allow Texas to maintain closer control of union activity. Thomas, 323 U.S. at 519.
The statute required union organizers to file a written request by mail before
attempting to solicit new members in Texas. § 5.
43
Thomas, 323 U.S. at 522.
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position regarding the right to receive information. The Court, in
dicta, emphasized Thomas’s right to speak and the public’s right to
45
hear his message. The Court found a restraint on free speech, thus
determining the restriction is “so destructive of the right of public
discussion, without greater or more imminent danger to the public
interest than existed in this case, is incompatible with the freedoms
46
secured by the First Amendment.” Thomas had a right to inform
the public about the merits of joining a union, and the government
47
could not restrain him from doing so.
The government, in
attempting to prevent the speech, violated both Thomas’s right to
48
speak and the audience’s right to hear his message. “That there was
a restriction upon Thomas’ right to speak and the rights of the
49
workers to hear what he had to say, there can be no doubt.”
Accordingly, Thomas had a right to give his speech, free from
50
governmental restraint. Again, as in Martin, the Court did not rely
on the right to receive information, but set the stage for future
analysis. Both Martin and Thomas are often cited as the precursors to
use of the right to receive information as a basis for holdings striking
51
down restraints on free speech.
52
By the time the Court decided Lamont v. Postmaster General, the
44

Id. at 534. The Court stressed that the holding did not facially invalidate the
Texas statute. Id. at 518. Instead, the Court viewed the case in the context of
Thomas making a public speech. Id. at 533. The Court did not extend the Texas
statute to allow the prevention of public speech. Id. at 534. Because Thomas did not
actually sign up any new members, the Court was able to narrowly construe his
actions as merely a speech on the merits of union membership. Id. at 533. If
Thomas had actually signed up any new members, the Court would likely have found
he violated the Texas statute and may have ruled differently. Thomas, 323 U.S. at
533.
45
Id. at 534. Thomas merely made a speech in Texas. Id. The Court refused to
force a speaker to register with the Texas government in order for the speaker to
enjoy the freedom to speak, and for the attendees to enjoy the corollary right to hear
the message. Id.
46
Id. at 537.
47
Id. at 532. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1940) (affirming
rights of union members to picket and disseminate information); Senn v. Tile Layers
Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468 (1937) (affirming rights of union members to
assemble and speak).
48
Thomas, 323 U.S. at 534.
49
Id. at 534.
50
Id. at 536.
51
See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Counsel, 425 U.S.
748 (1976); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557 (1969).
52
381 U.S. 301 (1965).
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Court had mentioned the right to receive information but had not
53
yet used it to form the basis of an opinion. In Lamont, the Court
faced a challenge to the constitutionality of Section 305(a) of the
54
Postal Service and Federal Employees Salary Act of 1962.
The
relevant part of the statute permitted the Postal Service to detain
“communist political propaganda” until the addressee requested the
55
mail be sent. Each piece of mail required an affirmative action on
the part of the addressee to send a reply card alerting the Post Office
56
of the addressee’s desire to receive the mail.
The Court struck down the statute as an unnecessary restraint on
57
free speech. Justice Brennan, in his concurrence, found that the
government’s actions amounted to an unnecessary restraint on free
58
speech and the corollary right to receive information. In Lamont,
the Court’s primary concern related to the additional burden placed
on a citizen to receive information, thus continuing the theme in
Thomas. By requiring an additional step by the addressee to obtain
his mail, the “regime of this Act is at war with the ‘uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open’ debate and discussion that are contemplated
59
by the First Amendment.” The Court equated the government’s
attempt in Lamont to control the flow of the mail to the attempt in

53

See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943); Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945).
54
39 U.S.C. § 4008(a) (1962). The statute gave the Postmaster General the
power to detain any mail, except sealed letters, that the Secretary of the Treasury
deemed to be communist political propaganda. Id. The addressee would then be
notified and would have to submit a written request for delivery to receive the mail.
Id. The statute further laid out a definition of “communist propaganda” to assist the
Postal Service in making such decisions to detain certain pieces of mail. § 4008(c).
55
Id. Leading up to this case, in the 1940s and 1950s, United States citizens and
the United States Government were fearful of Communism and its potential impact
on our country. ELLEN SCHRECKER, THE AGE OF MCCARTHYISM: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH
DOCUMENTS 9-15 (1994). Adding to these fears at the beginning of the Cold War
were the activities of Senator Joseph McCarthy and the House Un-American Activities
Committee. Id. “From the State Department and Congress to the Post Office and
the Supreme Court, federal bureaucrats, politicians, and judges struggled with the
issues of domestic communism as they debated and implemented policies to deal
with it.” Id.
56
Lamont, 381 U.S. at 303.
57
Id. at 307.
58
Id. at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring). See also Thomas, 323 U.S. at 534.
59
Lamont, 381 U.S. at 307 (quoting N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964)). The Court encountered a First Amendment issue in New York Times
regarding allegedly libelous statements printed about an elected official from
Alabama. 376 U.S. at 256.
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60

Thomas to control the flow of ideas. As the recipient of the mail
must have affirmatively acted to receive the mail in question, the
government was indirectly burdening the flow of information as it did
61
in Thomas.
This burden was an impermissible restraint on the
recipient’s right to receive information.
62
That same year, in Griswold v. Connecticut, a plurality of the
Court demonstrated its concern not only with protecting the First
Amendment rights of doctors and patients, but also the right to
privacy for actions occurring in a citizen’s home. In Griswold, the
government attempted to create a barrier between a citizen and
constitutionally protected information relating to the private affairs
of a husband and wife, thus violating the citizen’s right to receive
information. The appellants in the case were the executive director
and medical director for the New Haven location of the Planned
63
Parenthood League of Connecticut. The claims at issue related to
the constitutionality of two Connecticut statutes, which prohibited
64
the use and dissemination of contraception.
Striking down the
statutes, Justice Douglas, writing for a plurality, implicated the First
Amendment as a barrier to the government interfering in the
“intimate relation of husband and wife and their physician’s role in
65
one aspect of that relation.”
Justice Douglas opined
In other words, the State may not, consistently with the spirit of
the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of available
knowledge. The right of freedom of speech and press includes
not only the right to utter or to print, but the right to distribute,
the right to receive, the right to read and freedom of inquiry,
freedom of thought, and freedom to teach–indeed the freedom
66
of the entire university community.

Justice Douglas stressed the importance of the right of privacy and
60

Lamont, 381 U.S. at 306.
Id.
62
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
63
Id. at 480. One purpose of Planned Parenthood was to give “information,
instruction and medical advice” to prevent conception. Id.
64
Id. The Connecticut statutes provided for fine or imprisonment for use of
contraception or for providing and assisting with the use of contraception. CONN.
GEN. STAT. §§ 53-32, 54-196 (1958).
65
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482.
66
Id. See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 249-50 (1957); Weiman v.
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143
(1943).
61
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67

right of association. More specifically, the plurality found that the
right to receive requested constitutionally protected information is
one form of facilitating a citizen’s right to privacy in conducting his
68
personal affairs.
A few other cases within the category of governmental barriers
also relate specifically to the relationship between the right to receive
69
information and the rights to liberty and privacy.
In Stanley v.
70
Georgia, the Court ventured into new territory, protecting the “right
71
to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth.”
In Stanley, the state of Georgia investigated Stanley for bookmaking
72
activities.
While conducting a search of Stanley’s home, agents
73
found an obscene film. Following his arrest, a jury convicted Stanley
74
of possession of obscene matter. The issue before the United States
Supreme Court regarded the constitutionality of the Georgia statute
75
prohibiting private possession of obscene matter.
Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, used the right to
76
receive information as a basis to strike down the Georgia statute.
Recognizing the government’s interest in regulating obscene
information, Justice Marshall also affirmed that such interest is not
77
always paramount. The Court based its holding on the right to
67

Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483.
Id.
69
See also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (overturning a statute
prohibiting a parochial school teacher from teaching German to students who had
not completed eighth grade, finding a violation of student and teacher liberty).
70
394 U.S. 557 (1969).
71
Id. at 564. This case is the first and last time the Court allowed any kind of
protection of information deemed obscene. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109
(1990) (refusing to apply the principles set forth in Stanley, stating that the
government’s compelling interest in regulating child pornography outweighed the
plaintiff’s First Amendment rights). There is an argument that the Court is not truly
protecting obscene information, but rather the Court is protecting the right to have
that information in a citizen’s home. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 563. See, e.g., United States
v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
72
Stanley, 394 U.S. at 558.
73
Id. The statute at issue was GA. CODE ANN. § 26-6301 (Supp. 1968). The statute
deemed possession or distribution of obscene materials a felony. Id. The statute
defined obscene matter as “applying contemporary community standards, its
predominant appeal is prurient interest, i.e., a shameful or morbid interest in nudity,
sex or excretion.” Id.
74
Stanley, 394 U.S. at 559.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 563.
77
Id. Justice Marshall dismissed Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) as
dispositive, despite the holding in the case that obscene information is not
68
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receive information, coupled with the “fundamental . . . right to be
free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted
78
governmental intrusions into one’s privacy.” Given the nature of
the regulation regarding speech that is not constitutionally protected
and Justice Marshall’s statement that “it is now well established that
the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas,”
79
It is also
the Court gave the right its strongest endorsement.
important to note that Justice Marshall could have reached the
holding in this case without referencing the right to receive
information. This fact makes the Justice’s endorsement of the right
even stronger as Justice Marshall chose to include the right to receive
information is his analysis, even though it was not necessary.
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
80
Council, Inc., a statute prevented pharmacists from “publishing,
81
advertising, or promoting” the price of a prescription drug. The
Court found that the statute was an impermissible restraint on
82
commercial speech and the patients’ right to receive information.
This case both affirmed the protection of commercial speech and the
83
Court’s continued protection of the right to receive information.
Justice Blackmun opined that “[f]reedom of speech presupposes a
willing speaker. But where a speaker exists, as is the case here, the
protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its

constitutionally protected information. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 560. The Justice found
that the Roth decision could not be the only factor in determining whether a statute
that prohibits private possession of material is unconstitutional. Id. at 564. Justice
Marshall viewed this as more than a case of preventing obscenity but a case of a
citizen’s private possessions. Id.
78
Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564. This case is an example of the government striking
down a paternalistic statute. See Brian Verbon Cash, Images of Innocence or Guilt?: The
Status of Laws Regulating Child Pornography on the Federal Level and in Alabama and an
Evaluation of the Case Against Barnes & Noble, 51 ALA. L. REV. 793, 811-12 (2000).
Stanley “was based on a paternalistic interest in regulating thoughts out of fear that
obscenity would ‘poison the minds of its viewers’ and hurt public morality.” Id.
(citing Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 108-09 (1990)).
79
Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564.
80
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
81
Id. at 750. The Virginia Statute allowed the state to charge a pharmacist with
unprofessional conduct if he issued, published, or broadcasted any information
about prices for prescription drugs. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.35 (1974).
82
Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. at 772. This case is not the first to
announce First Amendment protection for commercial speech. See, e.g., Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Bread v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
83
Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. at 772.
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84

recipients both.”
Finding a solid basis in the free flow of ideas and information,
Justice Blackmun concluded that commercial speech is protected in
85
order to shelter consumers.
The Court held that governmental
barriers to dissemination of this kind of information will not be
86
tolerated. In First National Bank v. Bellotti, the Court addressed the
constitutionality of a Massachusetts statute that prohibited businesses
from publicizing views regarding questions posed on an election
87
ballot. Protecting corporate expression and the rights of businesses
88
to disseminate information, the Court struck down the law.
In
discussing the reasoning behind the holding, Justice Powell found
that “the First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and
the self-expression of individuals to prohibit government from
limiting the stock of information from which members of the public
89
may draw.”
The public has a right to gather all possible
information, despite its source, to make an effective judgment in
private affairs, thus promoting and enhancing the idea of self90
government.
2.

Uphold speech restrictions because other rights
outweigh audience rights

While this first category of cases supports the right to receive
information, there are a few cases where a separate right proves more
91
powerful. For example, in Kleindienst v. Mandel, Stanford University
84

Id. at 756.
Id. Sheltering consumers is one form of a paternalistic government the Court
is unwilling to accept. Id. at 770. Rather than allowing consumers to evaluate the
information prohibited by the statute, the government is making that decision for
consumers, thus keeping them in ignorance. Id. The Court does not find this type
of restriction an acceptable way for the government to achieve its interests. Id.
86
435 U.S. 765 (1978).
87
Id. at 769. The Massachusetts statute was designed to prevent businesses from
using influence and heightened resources to disseminate political views unless the
issue specifically related to the corporation’s business. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55,
§ 8 (West Supp. 1977).
88
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 795.
89
Id. at 783.
90
Id. The government should be prevented from denying citizens the right to
receive information merely because of the source of the information, unless there is
a compelling interest. Id. If a corporation’s management has views on a subject, the
public has a right to hear those views and evaluate them. Id. Preventing
dissemination of those views essentially makes decisions for citizens about what
information is important in evaluating the issue in question. Id.
91
408 U.S. 753 (1972).
85
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students invited Ernest Mandel, a Belgian citizen and Marxist scholar,
to lecture at a conference; nonetheless, the United States denied his
92
entrance into the country. He was forced to give his lecture via
93
telephone rather than in person. The Court refused to extend the
right to receive information to compel Congress to allow a visiting
94
lecturer from another country to attend an academic conference,
regardless of the fact that Congress’s denial of his visa stemmed from
95
Despite the fact that the
a dislike of Mandel’s political views.
students could not hear Mr. Mandel’s remarks in person, the Court
determined Congress’s refusal did not infringe the First Amendment
96
rights of the Americans who invited him. The opinion recognized
the First Amendment right to receive information, but held that it
did not override Congress’s right to exclude aliens from entry into
97
the country.
Justice Marshall, dissenting, saw the case as a clear-cut violation
98
of the First Amendment, and opined that “[t]he activity of speakers
becoming listeners and listeners becoming speakers in the vital
interchange of thought is the ‘means indispensable to the discovery
and spread of political truth.’ Its protection is ‘a fundamental
99
principle of the American government.’” Justice Marshall opposed
the Court’s analysis and found the Court balanced the competing
100
interests incorrectly, therefore infringing on the listener’s rights.
92

Id. at 759.
Id. Mr. Mandel, a Belgian journalist and author of a book entitled Marxist
Economic Theory was invited by students to speak at a conference on Technology and the
Third World at Stanford University. Id. at 756. Mr. Mandel then applied to the
American Consul in Brussels under federal law to obtain permission to enter the
United States. Id. at 757. His application was denied. Id.
94
Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 754.
95
Id. at 762.
96
Id. at 765.
97
Id. at 764. The Court found that Congress, in enacting statutes to regulate
entry into the country, had a compelling governmental interest that outweighed the
students’ right to receive Mr. Mandel’s information in the form of a live speech. Id.
at 765. While the Court does not ultimately dispose of the case using the right to
receive information, it is important to note that the right is still viable and that strict
scrutiny is applied when the right is threatened. Id.
98
Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 775. Again showing Justice Marshall’s unwavering
support for First Amendment rights, the Justice would have found that Congress’s
rationale was not compelling enough to overtake the students’ First Amendment
rights. Id. at 785.
99
Id. at 775-76 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
100
Id. Justice Marshall criticizes the majority for only allowing a “[m]erely
‘legitimate’ governmental interest[]” to “override constitutional rights.” Id. at 777.
93
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B. Government action requiring affirmative acts by the Press
1.

Uphold affirmative speech requirements out of
concern for audience rights

The Court has only used the right to receive information to
101
require an affirmative act by speakers in a handful of cases.
The
102
first, Red Lion Broadcasting v. Federal Communications Commission,
involved a Constitutional challenge to the FCC’s Fairness Doctrine
and section 315 of the Communications Act requiring “that [a]
discussion of public issues be presented on broadcast stations, and
103
that each of those issues must be given fair coverage.”
Relying
heavily on the fact that broadcast frequencies are scarce, the Court
104
upheld the constitutionality of the Fairness Doctrine.
The Court
found that the Fairness Doctrine enhanced the freedoms associated
105
with freedom of speech and the press.
The crux of the argument
rested on the notion that the right of free speech does not allow a
broadcaster to ignore the free speech of others given the scarcity of
Justice Marshall, as evidenced in later cases, is the strongest proponent for strong use
of the right to receive information. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969);
Meyers v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
101
See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm. v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998); FCC v.
League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984); CBS v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412
U.S. 94 (1973). All three decisions reject “the argument that broadcast facilities
should be open on a nonselective basis to all persons wishing to talk about public
issues.” CBS, 412 U.S. at 105. These cases do not discuss the right to receive
information or issues of scarcity, but deal with whether the public forum doctrine
should be extended to public television broadcasting. Id. While the analysis is
different, the result conflicts with the analysis in Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367 (1969). See infra notes 100-07 and accompanying text. It is also important
to note, however, that the Court in League of Women Voters implied that the
government may treat broadcasting differently from other media, thus not
completely turning away from Red Lion. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 376-77,
380, 402. The Court in Forbes further implied that candidate debates required a
special analysis and are an exception to the above stated rule requiring strict scrutiny.
Forbes, 523 U.S. at 675. Lastly, the Court in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997),
continued to recognize the fact that broadcasting is treated differently than other
forms of media expression. Id. at 867.
102
395 U.S. 367 (1969).
103
Id. at 369. The Fairness Doctrine and a provision of the Communications Act,
47 U.S.C. § 315 (1967), place requirements on broadcasters. 47 U.S.C. § 315. The
FCC’s Fairness Doctrine deals with personal attacks in the context of controversial
public issues and political editorializing. Id. Section 315 of the Communications Act
requires broadcasters to provide candidates with equal airtime to discuss their views.
Id.
104
Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 392-93.
105
Id. at 393.
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106

the broadcast frequencies.
The Court posited that “[i]t is the
purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather
than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by
107
the Government itself or a private licensee.”
The government’s mandate required an affirmative act on the
part of the broadcasters, essentially taking away the broadcasters’
108
right to make certain choices relating to content. The Court found
that “[i]t is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social,
political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is
crucial here. That right may not constitutionally be abridged either
109
In another medium, this analysis
by Congress or by the FCC.”
would more than likely fail.
The Court also upheld a restraint on a broadcaster’s freedom to
choose editorial content in CBS v. Federal Communications
110
Commission.
Petitioner CBS sought to invalidate a provision of the
111
Communications Act as an impermissible restraint on its free
112
The statute
speech and ability to choose editorial content.
provided that the FCC may revoke a broadcaster’s license “for willful
or repeated failure to allow reasonable access to or to permit
purchase of reasonable amounts of time for the use of a broadcasting
station . . . by a legally qualified candidate for Federal elective office
106

Id. The Court justified the different First Amendment standards due to the
different mediums that supply information. Id. at 386. Based on the universal reach
of a radio signal and the highly technical nature of the medium, the Court found the
government had significant interest in regulating the forum.
Id. at 387.
Furthermore, because broadcast radio reaches large audiences, the government must
intervene to allow radio to be used effectively. Id. at 389. Without government
regulation the hope for intelligible information is lost, as too many people will be
competing to use the same broadcast frequencies. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389.
Therefore, it is an unfortunate consequence that certain willing broadcasters will be
turned away due to scarce resources. Id. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512
U.S. 622 (1994).
107
Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
108
Id. Normally the right of the press would overshadow any requirements the
government may impose. Because of the difficulty in entering the broadcasting
market and the limited number of broadcast channels, however, the Court chose to
protect the public’s right to receive both sides of a story rather the press’s right to
choose content. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389.
109
Id. at 390. The Court is explaining the rationale behind allowing the Fairness
Doctrine. Id.
110
453 U.S. 367 (1981).
111
47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7).
112
CBS, 453 U.S. at 373-74.
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113

on behalf of his candidacy.” After the networks denied the CarterMondale Presidential Committee’s request for airtime relating to
President Carter’s formal announcement of his candidacy, the
campaign filed a complaint with the FCC alleging the networks
114
violated section 312(a)(7)’s reasonable access requirement.
The Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute and the
115
Carter-Mondale charge. Citing Red Lion, the Court found,
A license permits broadcasting, but the licensee has no
constitutional right to be the one who holds the license or to
monopolize a . . . frequency to the exclusion of his fellow citizens.
There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the
Government from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with
116
others . . . .

In other words, broadcast media is different from other media,
therefore the government was allowed to step in and ensure that all
117
viewpoints are heard.
The Court noted that “[s]ection 312 (a)(7)
[sic] thus makes a significant contribution to freedom of expression
by enhancing the ability of candidates to present, and the public to
receive, information necessary for the effective operation of the
118
democratic process.”
2.

Striking down speech requirements because audience
interest is met otherwise

In contrast, in Miami Herald Publishing Co. Division of Knight
119
Newspapers, Inc. v. Tornillo, the Court struck down, as a restraint on
freedom of press, a Florida statute that required a newspaper to give
an opportunity for reply to a person running for office if the
120
newspaper published a criticism about that candidate. The tension
113

47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7). The stated purpose of the Act was to “give candidates
for public office greater access to the media so that they may better explain their
stand on the issues, and thereby more fully and completely inform the voters.” CBS,
453 U.S. at 379 (quoting S. REP. NO. 92-96, at 20 (1971)).
114
Id. at 373-74.
115
Id. at 397.
116
CBS, 453 U.S. at 395 (quoting Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389).
117
Id. at 396. See also CBS v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973)
(observing the competing interests of the role of the government and the role of the
press).
118
CBS, 453 U.S. at 396.
119
418 U.S. 241 (1974).
120
Id. at 257. The “Right to Reply Statute,” FLA. STAT. § 104.38 (1973), provided a
candidate running for public office the opportunity to reply to any negative
commentary in any newspaper about that candidate’s personal character or official
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between the right to receive information and the free flow of
information versus the freedom of the press is epitomized in this
case. The right of the press ultimately prevailed. The Court found it
was no longer the right of listeners that are “paramount” once the
121
scarcity issue, as seen in Red Lion, was no longer a factor. The Court
concluded that
[e]ven if a newspaper would face no additional costs to comply
with a compulsory access law and would not be forced to forgo
publication of news or opinion by the inclusion of a reply, the
Florida statute fails to clear the barriers of the First Amendment
122
because of its intrusion into the function of editors.

This case shows a clear boundary over which the Court is unwilling to
step. This case also shows a limitation of the right to receive
information in the context of the government requiring an
affirmative act by the press to disseminate information where there
are no scarcity of resource issues due to the government’s action in
giving broadcasters a monopoly over broadcast frequencies.

C. Claim of access to information in government’s possession
Libraries/Book Removal
123

In Board of Education v. Pico, the Court encountered a local
New York board of education decision to remove certain
“objectionable” books from the libraries of the junior and senior high
124
schools.
The school board, a state agency and government actor,
made a decision to remove the books in order to “protect the

record. Id.
121
Id. at 258. This analysis is dominant in press cases where the Court balances
audience’s right to receive information and the freedom of the press to choose
content. Id.
122
Id.
123
457 U.S. 853 (1982).
124
Id. at 872. The Board of Education of the Island Trees Union Free School
District Number 26 determined that the books in question were “anti-American, antiChristian and anti-Semitic.” Id. at 857. The books at issue at Island Trees High
School were Slaughter House Five by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.; The Naked Ape by Desmond
Morris; Down These Mean Streets by Piri Thomas; Best Short Stories of Negro Writers edited
by Langston Hughes; Go Ask Alice, of anonymous authorship; Laughing Boy by Oliver
LaFarge; Black Boy by Richard Wright; A Hero Ain’t Nothin’ But A Sandwich by Alice
Childress; and Soul on Ice by Eldridge Cleaver. Id. The book at issue at Island Trees
Memorial Junior High School was A Reader for Writers, edited by Jerome Archer. Id.
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children in our schools from this moral danger.” All of the books
were constitutionally protected and did not fall into any of the
126
categories of unprotected speech. A district court judge noted that
the record indicated that the Board of Education chose to remove
the particular books in question to make an example. The Board’s
motivation was to establish “proper” views and tastes for children,
127
rather than to protect their welfare.
The plurality opinion, written by Justice Brennan and joined by
two other Justices, began by acknowledging a school board’s broad
128
discretion in making content-based education decisions.
It also,
however, confirmed secondary students’ right to receive information
through reading as an essential part of a student’s freedom to
129
inquire. Because the students’ rights and those of the school board
may be in conflict, the Court fell short of recognizing the school
board’s absolute discretion, finding the board may not infringe upon
130
the students’ rights.
Specifically, the plurality determined that
book removal from school libraries is limited by the students’ First
131
Amendment rights:
“[W]e think that the First Amendment rights
of students may be directly and sharply implicated by the removal of
132
books from the shelves of a school library.”
Apparently, as one
commentator has noted, the Court is especially concerned with the
removal of previously available books and believes that “[a]n
unshelving implicates the right to receive information because the

125

Id. at 857.
Id. at 857 n.2.
127
Id. at 861.
128
Pico, 457 U.S. at 863.
129
Id. at 866.
130
Id.
131
Id. at 872. Book removal in public libraries is a frequently debated topic. See
generally Rosemary C. Salomone, Free Speech and School Governance in the Wake of
Hazelwood, 26 GA. L. REV. 253 (1992); Linda L. Berger, Government Owned Media: The
Government as Speaker and Censor, 35 CASE W. RES. 707 (1985); Martin D. Munic,
Education or Indoctrination – Removal of Books from Public School Libraries, 68 MINN. L.
REV. 213, 237 (1983). The Court has previously recognized a library staff’s broad
discretion is choosing appropriate content, citing the resource issue as the primary
rationale. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923). Libraries would be unable to house all of the information available,
and Courts are unable to step in and regulate the choices that the library is forced to
make. Pico, 457 U.S. at 866. Once a library does choose to obtain a book, however,
the First Amendment rights of the patrons are implicated when a library chooses to
make that book unavailable. Id.
132
Pico, 457 U.S. at 866.
126
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state is hindering access to information previously available.”
Justice Brennan, writing for the plurality, reaffirmed the
134
Constitutional protection of the right to receive information:
This right is an inherent corollary of the rights of free speech and
press that are explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution, in two
senses. First, the right to receive ideas follows ineluctably from
the sender’s First Amendment right to send them: The right of
freedom of speech and press embraces the right to distribute
literature, and necessarily protects the right to receive it. The
dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise willing
addressees are not free to receive and consider them. It would be
a barren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no
135
buyers.

Once the library makes the books available, the right to receive
136
information is implicated if those books are later taken away. The
Court remanded the case for further fact-finding regarding the
motivations behind removal of the books, holding that the students’
First Amendment right to receive information is implicated by
137
improperly motivated removal.
The right to receive information, however, is not as strongly
supported by Pico as might first appear. One of the Justices who
supported remand, Justice Blackmun, did not consider the right in
his discussion. He was more concerned with discrimination against
138
ideas and the Board of Education’s improper motives.
The fifth
vote for remand, Justice White, refused to consider the scope of the
student’s First Amendment rights, reasoning that such discussions
were premature until the facts regarding the board’s motives had
139
been clarified.
Even the plurality opinion qualified the right by
narrowly holding that the student’s First Amendment right is only
violated when the decision to remove a book is provoked by the
school board’s aversion to the ideas pronounced in the works in
133

Munic, supra note 131, at 237.
Pico, 457 U.S. at 866. The student’s right to receive information is at issue. Id.
Students’ First Amendment rights have previously been recognized, including the
right to receive more information than that which the State chooses to
communicate. See Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
135
Pico, 457 U.S. at 867 (internal quotations omitted). See also Lamont, 381 U.S. at
308; Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943).
136
Pico, 457 U.S. at 867.
137
Id. at 875.
138
Id. at 878.
139
Id. at 884.
134
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140

question.
This reasoning thereby forms a narrow right in the
context of school libraries.
Chief Justice Burger rejected the right recognized by the
plurality on grounds that it would involve an affirmative right to have
141
the government provide this information.
This, however,
mischaracterizes the right to receive information in the library
context. What is really involved is a right to maintain the status quo
to insure there is no improper removal of the library materials. In
the instance where the government chooses to restrict materials once
those materials are publicly offered, as in Pico, then an action to
compel the government to reacquire those materials will rely on a
142
negative right rather than a positive one.
Once the government
chooses to obtain and make information public, the government is
143
then unable to take it away for an improper purpose. Without the
government’s initial choice to offer information through the library,
144
an action to compel the offering would rely on a positive right.
Once the government has chosen to acquire the materials, however,
145
the right to compel the offering becomes negative.
Since this
Comment is focused on those materials previously offered, the right
to receive information would rely on a negative right. The removal of
books previously offered goes to the heart of the right to receive
146
information.
The state should not be permitted to choose to
communicate certain ideas nor remove those ideas from the public
once they have been offered.
Both Chief Justice Burger and then-Justice Rehnquist in their
dissents refused to recognize the right to receive information in the
147
context of junior and senior high schools. Neither Justice, however,
expressly stated that this right would not apply in the context of other
libraries. Further, Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that “the Court
148
has recognized a limited version of that right in other settings.”
Justice Rehnquist argued that the books are still available to students

140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148

Id. at 872.
Id. at 888.
Cross, supra note 2, at 865.
Pico, 457 U.S. at 871-72.
Id.
Id.
Ingber, supra note 16, at 2. The theme is the marketplace of ideas. Id.
Pico, 457 U.S. at 887, 910.
Id. at 911.
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149

outside of the school library.
This argument, however, also
distorted the real issue. The First Amendment rights of citizens do
not rest on their ability to speak in any forum. Rather, the First
Amendment is implicated when the citizens’ right to speak has been
censored in a certain forum. The same analysis applies to the First
Amendment right to receive information; it should not matter if the
audience can find the information elsewhere. What matters most is
that citizens are denied information due to government constraints
and improper motives.
Last, Justice Rehnquist expressed concern over the motive
requirement set forth by the plurality. The Justice posited that if
there is a true right to receive information, motive would not
150
matter. Just as there is no absolute First Amendment right to speak,
however, it follows there is not an absolute right to receive
information. The improper motive requirement is what makes this
case about the First Amendment. Without it, the case would merely
concern decisions unrelated to speech, such as removing a book
because of its condition.
The strengths of the right to receive information outweigh the
weaknesses explored in Pico. As such, Pico paves the way to invoke the
right in other library cases. This can be seen particularly in cases not
involving libraries in public schools, where the dissent’s position that
the right to receive information should not apply in school libraries is
inapplicable.
II. POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE RIGHTS
The distinction between positive and negative rights is
deceptively simple. Many scholars have attempted to define them,
151
but they do not agree on the details.
Professor Cross proposed
what may be the most satisfactory test for distinguishing them. “[I]f
there was no government in existence, would the right be
152
automatically fulfilled?” If there is no government in place and the
149

Id. at 915.
Id. at 917-18.
151
Gerald MacCallum wrote one of the first philosophical essays regarding the
distinction between positive and negative rights. Cross, supra note 2, at 865. “He
contended that all rights issues fit a triadic relationship: ‘x is (is not) free from y to
do (not do, become, not become) z.” Id. (citing Gerald MacCallum, Jr., Negative and
Positive Freedom, 76 PHIL. REV. 312, 314 (1967)). X is the actor, Y prevents the action,
and Z is the action. Id.
152
Id. at 866.
150
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right is fulfilled, that right would be a negative right; however, if
government action is necessary to fulfill the mandate, then the right
153
is considered positive.
For the purpose of this Comment, the
definition of a positive right is a “right to command government
154
while a negative right is “a right to be free from
action,”
155
government.”
The debate surrounding the difference between positive and
negative rights hinges on whether the Constitution’s text even
156
The standard view is that the
recognizes positive rights.
157
Constitution is “a charter of negative rather than positive liberties.”
Many scholars, however, such as Stephen Holmes and Cass Sunstein,
158
argue that the Due Process Clause does include positive rights.
They assert that states must make courts available to enforce contract
rights, that government must create trespass laws to enforce
protection against takings, and that liberty includes providing police
159
protection.
Professor Cross rejects their contentions on the basis of Supreme
Court decisions and on a different interpretation of the text of the
160
Constitution. Currently, no Supreme Court case recognizes positive
rights, although the Court has noted the distinction between positive
161
In Deshaney v. Winnebago County Department of
and negative rights.
162
Social Services, the Court stated that “our cases have recognized that
the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to
governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure
life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may
163
not deprive the individual.”
There are many reasons why positive rights would cause
153

Id.
Id. at 864.
155
Id.
156
Cross, supra note 2, at 864. “Although the liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause affords protection against unwarranted government interference . . . , it does
not confer an entitlement to such [government assistance] as may be necessary to
realize all the advantages of that freedom.” Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18
(1980).
157
Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983).
158
See STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS SUNSTEIN, THE COSTS OF RIGHTS 52-54 (1999).
159
Id. at 52-56.
160
Cross, supra note 2, at 872.
161
Id. at 874.
162
489 U.S. 189 (1989).
163
Id. at 196.
154
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difficulties if utilized.
According to Professor Cross,
[t]he recognition of positive rights holds out the prospect that the
courts can be petitioned to intervene and compel such action,
when the legislature fails to act sufficiently to advance the rights.
Hence, the crucial issue is the effect of permitting judicial
enforcement of these rights. The inability of the judiciary to
develop remedies that effectively enforce positive rights
164
constitutes a reason not to recognize them.

Courts cannot enforce judicially-made rights without the support
of the legislature; therefore, the politics of rights enforcement weigh
against recognition. The crux of the argument is that “it is futile to
rely on the judiciary to provide basic welfare for the disadvantaged, if
165
the political branches are unwilling to do so.” One of the primary
reasons driving the limitations of the judiciary is that positive rights
often require the government to spend money in enforcing the
166
right.
Considering the judiciary has no control over budgets and
government money spent, requiring the government to enforce such
167
a right is often not the business of the courts. The credibility of the
courts could be at issue as the courts are unable to enforce a decision
168
Furthermore, the
if the government chooses not to support it.
judiciary should not make it their function to create policy.
Last, the economics of law enforcement weigh against
recognition of positive rights. In order to enforce positive rights, a
plaintiff must have the ability to take advantage of the legal system,
169
which requires the necessary resources.
Generally speaking, the
group of people most likely to bring an action to enforce a positive
170
right is the poor.
Unfortunately, that group is the one that
164

Cross, supra note 2, at 879.
Id. at 888.
166
Id. at 889.
167
Id. See also Herman Schwartz, Recent Development: Do Economic and Social Rights
Belong in a Constitution?, 10 AM. U.J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1233, 1237 (1995).
168
Cross, supra note 2, at 889. “[T]he intractable economic, social and even
philosophical problems presented by public welfare assistance programs are not the
business of this Court.” Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970).
169
Cross, supra note 2, at 880.
170
Id. Professor Cross cites studies that identify six resources necessary for success
in litigating for rights enforcement: (1) amount of money available, (2) support of
the federal government, (3) ability to maintain the effort over long periods of time,
(4) expert legal staff, (5) publicity and, (6) cooperation of other groups with similar
interests. Id. (citing LEE EPSTEIN, CONSERVATIVES IN COURT 12-13 (1985)). The study
concludes that the best results occur when all six factors are present. Id.
165
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struggles most to afford the necessary representation to litigate such
claims, especially considering those claims generally must end up in
171
front of the United States Supreme Court.
Therefore, the
economics of positive right enforcement is another reason why
positive rights are rarely recognized. While negative rights also cost
money to enforce, positive right enforcement requires the first step
of recognition of that right, something the Court has not yet done,
thereby proving fairly cost prohibitive for poorer groups more likely
to try to bring a suit based on a positive right.
For the above reasons, society has never fully embraced positive
172
rights, nor have the courts recognized them.
Applying the
definition stated above to the right to receive information, the second
category of cases requiring the government to force access to certain
173
information falls into the category of a positive right. The audience
would not hear the information in question unless the government
174
Therefore, based on that
acted to enable the dissemination.
definition, the right to receive information, in certain contexts, is a
positive right. The framework for the right to receive information as
a positive right is splintered and it is often difficult to predict how the
175
Court will rule in a case depending on the medium of expression.
At first glance, the Pico decision appeared to be mandating
positive rights; however, after further analysis, the decision in fact
relied on negative rights as the government had already decided to
176
provide the information before the public requested it.
The
difference between the right described in Pico and a positive right is
that once the government makes certain information available, the
government cannot later decide to make that information
171

Id. “The key to effective rights enforcement is a ‘support structure for legal
mobilization,’ which requires ‘rights-advocacy organizations, a diverse and
organizationally sophisticated legal profession, a broad array of financing sources,
and federal rights-advocacy efforts.’” Id. at 880 (quoting CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS
REVOLUTION 69 (1998)).
172
Cross, supra note 2, at 879.
173
Id. at 866.
174
Id.
175
Compare Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (finding a First
Amendment violation when a court closed voir dire proceedings), and Richmond
Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (declaring a First Amendment right of
access to court proceedings), with Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (denying
the press the right to access prisons to observe conditions), and Saxbe v. Washington
Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974) (upholding regulations preventing the press from
interviewing particular prisoners).
176
Pico, 457 U.S. at 871-72.
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unavailable, thus relying on a negative right. Granting the public’s
demand for that information once it is available is a negative right
because the public is demanding what has already been given, not
asking for information the government has not already chosen to
178
make accessible. This is a strong use of the right, thus preventing a
paternalistic government from having the ability to determine when
all information in the government’s possession will be available. So
long as the information is in the public domain, the Court should
continue to enable the public to have access to it, unless there is a
compelling governmental interest for its removal. In the analysis for
removal, the Court would focus on the motives behind information
removal to ensure only neutral reasons drive the decisions for
removal.
III. CURRENT USE OF THE RIGHT TO RECEIVE INFORMATION –
AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION
The Court decided the most recent case relating to the right to
receive information in 2003. United States v. American Library
179
Association involved a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the
180
Children’s Internet Protection Act (“CIPA”). CIPA was designed to
assist federal public libraries in providing Internet access to library
181
The funding was conditioned upon the library installing
patrons.
filtering software designed to prevent access to obscenity and any
182
other information deemed harmful to children. CIPA permits the
library to set the filters to block certain categories of sites, such as
183
those containing pornography or violence.
The library has some
177

Id.
Cross, supra note 2, at 866.
179
539 U.S. 194 (2003).
180
20 U.S.C. § 9134 (2004).
181
Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 199. There are two programs of federal
assistance. Id. The first, the E-rate program allows libraries to buy discounted
Internet access to make the acquisition more affordable. Id. The second program,
pursuant to the Library Services and Technology Act gives grants to library agencies
for Internet access. Id.
182
Id. The technology of library filters is far from perfect. Id. at 208. In many
cases, the filters are both over and under inclusive, at times allowing information
supposedly blocked to pass and at other time preventing protected information that
should not be filtered. Id. The plurality appears to dismiss this issue, while Justice
Kennedy and Justice Breyer acknowledge the problem. Id. at 234, 238-39.
183
Id. at 200. For a more detailed look at the technology of filters, see Junichi P.
Semitsu, Burning Cyberbooks in Public Libraries: Internet Filtering Software vs. The First
Amendment, 52 STAN. L. REV. 509 (2000); Glenn Kutoba, Public School Usage of Internet
178
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flexibility and may set the filters to enable certain categories that
might otherwise be blocked or to add or delete specific sites as
184
necessary. The primary issue in the case revolved around whether
CIPA’s filtering requirement violated the First Amendment rights of
the libraries to choose content and also the First Amendment rights
185
of the patrons to receive information.
The district court found
CIPA facially unconstitutional and enjoined the appropriate
government agencies from withholding funding for those libraries
186
that did not comply with CIPA’s filtering terms.
The Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion written by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, upheld the constitutionality of CIPA, finding no
187
impermissible restraints on First Amendment rights. The plurality
equated a library’s right to choose what Internet sites should be
available with its right to make content-based determinations to buy
or not buy printed materials, and affirmed previous decisions
regarding the broad discretion the library staff enjoys in choosing
188
content.
In reaching this conclusion, Chief Justice Rehnquist first
examined the role of public libraries in society and the relevant
history driving a library’s mission to “facilitate learning and cultural
189
enrichment.”
After determining that public libraries do not
provide “universal coverage,” Chief Justice Rehnquist analogized the
library’s right to make content choices with the government’s right to
190
determine what private speech should be made public.
“Just as
Filtering Software: Book Banning Reincarnated?, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 687 (1997).
184
Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 200.
185
Id.
186
Id. at 202. The court held the filters were a content-based restriction on access
to a public forum and applied strict scrutiny. Id.
187
Id. at 214.
188
Id. at 206. See Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982). Justice Souter argued
against the majority opinion on grounds that the scarcity of resources which justifies
choosing one book and not another does not apply to the Internet. See Am. Library
Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 235 (Souter, J., dissenting). The library staff does not have to worry
about finding enough space to house “the Internet” in that it does not take up
physical space the way that books, periodicals or other printed materials do. Id. For
this reason, the Court could have chosen, but did not, to treat the library staff’s
discretion in the way they treated the Board of Education’s decision in Pico and
scrutinize the filtering system closer.
189
Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 206. Chief Justice Rehnquist cited the American
Library Association’s Bill of Rights as the basis for the mission. Id. “[L]ibraries
should ‘provide books and other resources for the interest, information, and
enlightenment of all people of the community the library serves.’” Id. at 203-04
(citation omitted).
190
Id. at 204-05. Chief Justice Rehnquist cited Arkansas Educational Television
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forum analysis and the heightened judicial scrutiny are incompatible
with the role of public television states and the role of the NEA, they
are also incompatible with the discretion that public libraries must
191
have to fulfill their traditional missions.”
Therefore, Chief Justice
Rehnquist made no distinction between the library’s discretion in
choosing printed materials and its discretion in providing access to
192
certain web sites.
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s reasoning essentially ignored the
inherent difference in the manner in which Internet access and
193
printed materials are chosen and provided.
All printed materials
194
are handpicked, primarily due to scarcity of resources and space.
The Internet, however, is a package and does not require a library to
195
There is
exercise discretion in choosing which sites are available.
196
no space or scarcity of resources issues. While libraries do not have
the time or space available to allow all library visitors to spend as
much time as they want utilizing the computers, libraries also do not
allow patrons to take out books indefinitely, nor can they allow
patrons to sit and read the newspapers they offer all day. Just as it
would be improper for a library to cut up a newspaper and only
provide the part the staff feels is proper, so is taking out parts of the
Internet that the library previously purchased as a package. So long
as the information is available, the right to receive information is
satisfied. The Chief Justice’s opinion, rather, focused on the library’s
traditional mission and equated the library’s mission of providing
197
Internet access to its same mission for providing printed materials.
Therefore, the Court extended the same basis of review to libraries
for content-based decisions for printed materials, rational basis
review, as the Court extended for content-based decisions regarding

Commission v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998), and National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,
524 U.S. 569 (1998), as support for his analogy. Id. The Forbes case, however,
appears to contradict the Court’s decision in Red Lion, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), a case
that Chief Justice Rehnquist failed to mention.
191
Id. at 205.
192
Id. at 208. Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that the library chooses to exclude
pornography for its other collections, so the Internet should be no different. Id.
193
Semitsu, supra note 183, at 527.
194
Id.
195
Id.
196
Id.
197
Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 206. The library’s traditional mission is “to
facilitate research, learning, and recreational pursuits by furnishing materials of
appropriate and requisite quality.” Id.
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Internet access.
Justice Kennedy concurred because he believed that a patron’s
ability to disable the filters saves the law from facial
199
unconstitutionality.
The Justice was willing, however, to consider
possible future challenges if a patron was able to show that protected
speech had been blocked and the patron was unable to succeed in
convincing a library representative to unblock the filter. Justice
Kennedy, however, was convinced by the remainder of the Chief
Justice’s arguments and agreed that the compelling governmental
interest of protecting young library users, coupled with the plaintiffs’
failure to show that adult library users are actually hindered in
obtaining protected speech, supported the constitutionality of
200
CIPA.
The plurality opinion did not address the right to receive
information. Justice Breyer, in his concurrence, recognized that
right, but he ultimately agreed with the judgment of the plurality and
201
upheld CIPA.
Justice Breyer believed that because CIPA “directly
restricts the public’s receipt of information,” heightened scrutiny is
202
the correct standard to apply.
The Justice declined to apply strict
scrutiny because CIPA affects a library’s discretion in selection,
203
The Justice’s
creation, and maintenance of a collection.
application ultimately balanced the importance of CIPA’s goals and
204
the alternatives to meet those goals.
Because he found no other
means to filter the undesired information, Justice Breyer concurred
in the judgment. Justice Breyer’s application of heightened but not
strict scrutiny takes away some of the protection defenders of the
205
right to receive information would like it to receive.
Two dissents appear in the case, the first written by Justice
206
Stevens.
Justice Stevens viewed this case from the library’s
perspective and found CIPA to be an unconstitutional restraint on
the library’s First Amendment rights, arguing that judgments about
what material to make available and how are better left to local
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206

Id. at 210.
Id. at 214-15 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 216 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 216.
Id.
Id. at 217.
Id.
Id. at 220 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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governments to narrowly tailor a solution fitting the issue.
Justice
Stevens’s opinion focused on the less restrictive alternatives
208
available, rather than the current technology that both over- and
209
210
Because CIPA hindered the
under-blocks certain web sites.
library’s discretion to choose its materials, the government’s action
forcing the filters in order to obtain funding unconstitutionally
211
restrains the library’s First Amendment rights.
The second dissent, written by Justice Souter and joined by
Justice Ginsberg, took a different perspective, considering CIPA from
212
the perspective of the library patron, or the audience.
Justice
Souter took issue with the potential overblocking of protected sites,
as it would be unconstitutional for a library to restrict an adult’s
213
access to protected sites despite CIPA’s mandate.
Justice Souter
equated filtering with censorship, rejecting the plurality’s analysis
214
that equated filters with a library’s selection of available materials.
Therefore, Justice Souter distinguished a library’s discretion in
215
choosing print materials and in choosing Internet access.
He
argued that a library has greater discretion in choosing print
216
materials because of space and money constraints. Neither of these
217
issues are of concern in regards to Internet access.
As a result,
207

Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 223 n.3.
See infra Conclusion.
209
“Over-blocking” and “under-blocking” are terms of art referencing the
propensity of the filtering software to either incorrectly block sites that should not be
blocked, or incorrectly display websites that should have been blocked, respectively.
Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 223 n.3.
210
Id. at 223-24. Like the District Court, Justice Stevens cited the alternatives that
are available at a local level. Id. at 223. These alternatives include library
enforcement of policies that do not allow access to obscenity, requiring parental
consent for minors to use Internet terminals, privacy screens, recessed monitors, and
hidden placement of Internet terminals. Id.
211
Id. “The effect of the overblocking is the functional equivalent of a host of
individual decisions excluding hundreds of thousands of individual constitutionally
protected messages from Internet terminals located in public libraries throughout
the nation.” Id. at 222 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
212
Id. at 231 (Souter, J., dissenting).
213
Id. Justice Souter did not find the Solicitor General’s assurances that a library
patron could ask to unblock a site as convincing as the plurality did. Id. The Justice
cited the FCC’s failure to set federal policy for local libraries to know when
unblocking would be suitable. Id.
214
Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 235.
215
Id. at 236-37.
216
Id.
217
Id. The Internet is purchased as a package, rather than selected one site at a
time. Id. Therefore, filtering is more like removal, and less like selection. Id.
208
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there should be different levels of scrutiny to determine if a library
patron’s First Amendment rights have been abridged depending on
the type of material that the library is selecting.
The proper analogy therefore is not to passing up a book that
might have been bought; it is either to buying a book and then
keeping it from adults lacking an acceptable ‘purpose,’ or to
buying an encyclopedia and then cutting out pages with anything
218
thought to be unsuitable for all adults.

Therefore, Justice Souter would have applied strict scrutiny to CIPA
and would have found that the filtering requirement violated an
219
adult patron’s First Amendment rights.
CONCLUSION
The right to receive information is a corollary of the right to
220
speak, meaning that audience rights stem from speaker rights. The
common theme in the first category of cases discussed in Part I is the
221
government’s attempt to prevent otherwise protected speech. The
attempts to prevent such speech occur in various ways, including
specific criminal statutes, censorship of mail, and limitations on
222
corporation expression.
In balancing the competing interests in
those cases, it is clear that if the speech is protected, the government
customarily has no place regulating the dissemination of information.
Therefore, the Court should utilize the right to receive information
going forward to prevent governmental barriers to protected
information, in line with years of strong precedent.
The second category of cases represents the rare case where the
government, due to limitations on broadcast frequencies, will require
223
the press to make information available to the public.
This small
set of cases is unlikely to be duplicated, thus the analysis should not
be used in the future, especially given the advent of new technology.
The final category of cases has the potential to permit audience use
218

Id. at 237.
Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 242-43.
220
See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408-09 (1974); Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969);
Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
221
See discussion supra Part I.A (describing the history of the right to receive
information in the context of prevention of government barriers to protected
information).
222
See discussion supra Part I.A.
223
See discussion supra Part I.B (describing the press cases relating to the Fairness
Doctrine).
219
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of the right to receive information to claim access to information in
the government’s possession. To compel the government to give the
public access to information in its possession requires reliance on a
224
positive right. Because of the judiciary’s limited capacity to enforce
such rights, reliance on a positive right is not a strong use of the right
225
to receive information. Within this category of cases, however, are
opinions that prevent the government from giving information and
then later taking it away. This group of opinions represents a second
226
strong application of the right to receive information.
Once the government chooses to make the information
available, the right to receive that information prevents the
government from later taking that information away from the
227
public. The decision to permit the information to be public is one
that has already been made; therefore, any action to ensure that the
228
information remains public would rely on a negative right.
Here,
the action would essentially be similar to the first group of cases
preventing governmental barriers to information.
A natural case to reference in the Court’s American Library
Association decision would have been Pico, as removal of websites is
229
the equivalent to the removal of books.
The plurality, however,
chose to reject the analogy and instead determined that the two are
230
not related. The dissent recognized this analogy and applied strict
231
scrutiny, in line with precedent.
The plurality misapplied
precedent by ignoring the similarity in facts to Pico. In Pico, the Court
prevented the government from improperly removing books from
232
the school library it had already chosen to acquire.
In American
Library Association, the Court should have prevented the government
from removing websites it had already chosen to acquire. The
224

See discussion supra Part II (defining positive rights and applying the analysis to
the right to receive information).
225
Cross, supra note 2, at 872.
226
See discussion supra Part I.B (distinguishing between cases where the
government is required to provide information and cases where the government had
already provided the information and then attempts to take that information away).
227
Pico, 457 U.S. at 868.
228
See discussion supra Part II (defining positive rights and applying the analysis to
the right to receive information).
229
See discussion supra Part III (providing a detailed account of the United States
Supreme Court’s recent decision in American Library Association).
230
See discussion supra Part III.
231
See discussion supra Part III.
232
Pico, 457 U.S. at 872.
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Internet is purchased as a package thus giving access to all available
sites. Therefore, public libraries should not have free reign to pick
and choose which websites should be publicly available. It is up to
the patron to make content choices, rather than having the library
limit those choices improperly. As Justice Souter stated, “[D]eciding
against buying a book means there is no book (unless a loan can be
obtained), but blocking the Internet is merely blocking access
purchased in its entirety and subject to unblocking if the librarian
233
agrees.” The dissent’s analogy is the correct application of the right
to receive information; once the library chooses to obtain content,
the library should not be permitted to later remove that content.
Furthermore, the government can meet the goal of CIPA, to
protect children from harmful messages, through less restrictive
234
means without infringing the right to receive information.
For
example, a library can choose to permit certain computers to be
available for use by children. Those computers could contain filters
and be located in the children’s section, while other computers in the
library for adult use would be free from filters and located in a
separate section of the library. Second, the library can institute a
policy only enabling children to use the Internet with adult
supervision, thereby dispensing with the need for filters. Finally, the
library can make a strict policy that forbids anyone from making
obscene or harmful information available to children. Anyone found
to violate this policy, enforced by other patrons and library staff,
would be denied access to the library. Any of these suggestions would
be a less restrictive way to accomplish the goals of CIPA and protect a
235
library patron’s First Amendment rights.
Ideally, the strongest case application for the right to receive
information is to extend free speech rights to speakers and
audiences, unless the government has a compelling interest. The two
categories, preventing barriers and precluding government from
withholding previously accessible information, are the two strongest
applications. The decision in American Library Association, however,
has undermined the right in the second context despite the
plurality’s attempts to distinguish the facts in Pico. The decision to
disregard the clear similarities between the two cases ignores the fact
that once the government chooses to make access to the Internet in
233
234
235

Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 237.
Id. at 223.
See id.
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public libraries available, the government should not improperly
determine which websites to make available. Despite the American
Library Association decision, the Court should continue to use this
conceptual framework and apply the right to receive information to
prevent the government from creating barriers to information and to
inhibit the government from acquiring information for public use
and later attempting to improperly remove public access to that
information.

